

Human Performance in High-Reliability Transportation Systems: The Role of Cultural Intelligence

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ABSTRACT

High-reliability transportation systems (e.g., commercial aviation, maritime operations, and high-speed rail) operate under unforgiving conditions where failure can result in catastrophic outcomes. In these settings, human performance remains a decisive factor in maintaining operational safety, efficiency, and resilience. While traditional human factors research has addressed cognitive workload, situational awareness, and crew resource management, emerging challenges in an increasingly globalized and multicultural workforce call for a deeper understanding of interpersonal and cross-cultural dynamics. This paper focuses on Cultural Intelligence (CQ) as a pivotal yet underutilized capability that significantly affects performance in high-reliability transportation systems. Cultural Intelligence is defined as the ability to function effectively in culturally diverse settings. It encompasses four key dimensions: cognitive (knowledge of cultures), metacognitive (awareness and strategy), motivational (drive and interest), and behavioral (adaptability in communication and actions). Drawing from empirical studies and real-world observations in commercial aviation, this research demonstrates how high-CQ individuals and teams outperform their lower-CQ counterparts in areas critical to safety and reliability. A key finding of this research is the correlation between CQ and error mitigation. Miscommunications, often stemming from culturally mismatched expectations, have been root causes in many transportation incidents. Crews with high cultural intelligence demonstrate greater sensitivity to these discrepancies and proactively bridge communication gaps. Training and development of cultural intelligence are shown to be both feasible and impactful. The paper outlines strategies for integrating CQ into existing human factors training programs, such as scenario-based simulations, intercultural workshops, and targeted feedback mechanisms. These interventions not only enhance individual awareness but also promote a team-level shift toward adaptive and inclusive operational norms. Importantly, the research advocates for the institutionalization of CQ as a selection and evaluation criterion in leadership development, crew pairing, and team performance assessment. Moreover, as automation and artificial intelligence continue to transform transportation systems, human performance remains the fail-safe layer of defense against system breakdowns. In this evolving landscape, the human-machine interface will require not only technical fluency but also advanced social cognition skills. CQ will be essential in ensuring that teams can flexibly collaborate across traditional and digital boundaries, balancing human judgment with machine precision. In conclusion, this paper positions Cultural Intelligence as a critical human factor in the design, operation, and sustainability of high-reliability transportation systems. By recognizing and developing CQ among personnel at all levels, organizations can unlock a powerful lever for improving safety outcomes, operational resilience, and team performance in multicultural settings.

Keywords: Cultural intelligence, Human performance, High-reliability systems, Transportation safety, Multicultural teams, Operational resilience

INTRODUCTION

Aviation has long been the crucible in which human-factors ideas are forged and tested. Foundational models (i.e., from Reason's organizational accident theory and Swiss-cheese metaphor to the evolution of crew resource management - CRM) reoriented the field from "pilot error" to systemic vulnerability, latent conditions, and non-technical skills. These perspectives remain indispensable, yet today's teams work within an expanded socio-technical architecture: multinational crews, multilingual interactions, and organizational and national cultures that shape how authority is interpreted, how feedback is given or withheld, and how ambiguity is resolved under pressure (Reason, 1997; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).

Globalization made cultural diversity an operational constant rather than an exception. English phraseology is standardized, but the pragmatics of speech (i.e., directness, politeness, prosody) vary significantly. Differences in power distance, individualism–collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance influence assertiveness, challenge-and-response, and preference for procedural adherence versus adaptation. Under high workload, people revert to learned cultural scripts: silence in the face of hierarchy, indirect refusals misread as assent, or overreliance on rules when the situation demands flexibility (Hofstede & Minkov, 2010; Soeters & Boer, 2000). These patterns do not doom performance; they shape it, and thus must be addressed deliberately within training, leadership, and investigation. Moreover, Cultural Intelligence (CQ) offers a coherent framework. Defined as the capability to function effectively in culturally diverse settings, CQ comprises metacognitive (awareness and planning), cognitive (knowledge of norms and systems), motivational (interest and confidence), and behavioral (adaptive action) dimensions (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008; Livermore, 2011). These dimensions align with CRM competencies in communication, decision-making, leadership, teamwork, and situational awareness, bridging practically work-as-imagined to work-as-done. CQ reframes culture from a static backdrop to an actionable set of skills and habits that can be taught, observed, and assessed.

Nowadays culture also intersects with personality and identity. Psychological anthropology and cultural psychology highlight how selves are constructed differently across societies, with independent or interdependent emphases that carry operational consequences for challenge, autonomy, and consensus (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mead, 1950). Social attitudes like authoritarianism and social dominance can steepen authority gradients and erode inclusive interaction unless moderated by leadership and training. At the organizational level, Just Culture and safety culture aim to protect reporting and learning, but their lived expression is filtered through local norms and values (Reason, 1997). Integrating CQ into this landscape equips leaders and crews to embrace diversity without stereotyping, keeping the focus on behaviors that protect safety.

This paper advances three contributions. First, it synthesizes accumulated evidence that CQ improves performance on safety-critical tasks in multicultural operations, translating cultural theory into operationally

meaningful constructs. Second, it proposes a CQ-informed extension to investigation and training instruments (i.e., Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), Evidence-Based Training (EBT) and Competency-Based Training & Assessment (CBTA)) so that “culture” moves from anecdote to data. Third, it sketches a leadership and training architecture, grounded in International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) adoption of the Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate (ADDIE) model for instructional systems design and Kirkpatrick evaluation, for embedding CQ within CRMe without adding curricular bloat. The intention is translational: to offer aviation and other high-reliability domains a pragmatic route for developing, measuring, and sustaining culturally intelligent performance.

METHODOLOGY

The methodological posture is interpretivist and translational. Rather than testing a single hypothesis on a bounded dataset, the study builds an operational synthesis that connects theory, observation, and existing safety instruments. The inquiry proceeded in the following three linked strands (Table 1).

Firstly, a theory-led synthesis examined how cultural dynamics are represented across established accident models and training frameworks (i.e., Reason’s organizational accidents, HFACS, LOSA, and successive waves of CRM) identifying where current approaches acknowledge culture yet lack granularity at the level of observable, coachable behaviors. This synthesis foregrounded seminal cultural and human-factors work that has shaped aviation scholarship and practice, including national cultural dimensions and empirical CRM research (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008; Hofstede & Minkov, 2010).

Secondly, a CQ-to-competency mapping aligned the four CQ dimensions with CRM and CBTA behavioral markers. This mapping was informed by the structure of EBT/CBTA as adopted by ICAO and EASA and operationalized through ADDIE to guide design choices and Kirkpatrick’s four levels to close the evaluation loop. The aim was to ensure that CQ integration strengthens - not fragments - competency frameworks already in use by operators and regulators (ICAO Doc 9995; FAA AC 120-51E; EASA CBTA guidance).

Thirdly, a coding taxonomy was adapted for investigations and line observations to render cultural contributors visible in the same analytical space as threats, errors, and countermeasures. The taxonomy can be applied to simulator debriefs, CVR/ATC transcripts, and narrative reports. It complements HFACS by specifying where a breakdown coded as “communication” or “CRM” reflects a more precise CQ deficit (for example, motivational reluctance to challenge, or behavioral inability to frame dissent without loss of face). Mixed-methods use is encouraged: qualitative coding for pattern discovery and quantitative association with outcomes such as decision latency or go-around initiation.

Across strands, the study privileges practice-ready integration. Rather than proposing wholesale replacement of entrenched models, it offers inserts—behavioral markers, interview prompts, observer checklists—that fit within

existing training and oversight rhythms. Scenarios and debrief templates are designed to surface intercultural dynamics without caricature, allowing instructors to coach adaptive phrasing, calibrated assertiveness, and explicit confirmation strategies in culturally mixed crews. The approach treats culture as a dynamic field in which individuals actively negotiate norms, consistent with contemporary cultural psychology and psychological anthropology, and recognizes cultural relativity: what counts as “direct,” “respectful,” or “assertive” is relative to the interlocutors, not absolute.

Table 1: Research methodology overview.

Strand / Element	Purpose	Techniques / Artifacts
Research philosophy & aim	Interpretivist, translational stance to move cultural theory into operational practice	Synthesis across human-factors and cultural psychology; alignment to safety frameworks
Theory-led synthesis	Locate where existing models acknowledge but under-specify culture	Comparative reading of Reason/Swiss-cheese, CRM evolution; map cultural variables within HF models
CQ → competency mapping (CBTA/EBT)	Tie the four CQ dimensions to observable CRM/CBTA behaviors	Matrix linking metacognitive/cognitive/-motivational/behavioral CQ to communication, leadership, teamwork, decision-making
CQ coding for investigations	Render cultural contributors visible in occurrence analysis	20-item coding taxonomy aligned to CQ; integration into HFACS/LOSA categories and interview prompts
Scenario & instructor design	Implement CQ within training that instructors can run and evaluate	ADDIE + Kirkpatrick; simulator scenarios with intercultural dilemmas; debrief templates; instructor guides
Data inputs & triangulation	Ensure practice relevance and transfer	Simulator debriefs, LOSA observations, CVR/ATC transcripts, routine CBTA evidence, instructor notes
Limitations & next steps	Bound the claims and set a research agenda	Operational integration now; encourage mixed-methods evaluation to estimate effect sizes

Finally research and human factors limitations are acknowledged. The paper synthesizes and operationalizes existing knowledge; it does not present

a new multi-site dataset. However, by aligning CQ with familiar instruments, it establishes a tractable research program: operators can trial the coding and training inserts in routine EBT/CBTA cycles and LOSA observations, generating evidence on effect sizes and transfer. The methodological intent is to shorten the distance between cultural theory and safer operations, preparing the ground for rigorous follow-on evaluation.

FINDINGS

The research findings present how CQ functions as a performance amplifier in high-reliability transportation by linking individual capabilities to team behaviors and system outcomes. They are organized across three operational layers: (i) line operations (multinational crews, ATC interfaces, maintenance coordination), (ii) training and assessment (CRM, EBT/CBTA), and (iii) investigation and oversight (HFACS/LOSA).

1. CQ accelerates shared mental model formation under time pressure.

In high-tempo phases (e.g., weather diversions, automation anomalies, unstable approaches) multinational crews must converge quickly on a common picture. Metacognitive CQ supports briefings that anticipate cultural fault lines (for example, how a junior first officer from a high power-distance background might hesitate to challenge); behavioral CQ supplies the adaptive phrasing and non-verbal alignment that keep dialogue efficient without triggering defensiveness. Crews demonstrating these behaviors produce earlier convergence on plans, cleaner task division, and fewer “late surprises,” particularly in abnormal procedures. These observations are consistent with CRM’s emphasis on mental model alignment but add a mechanism: culturally intelligent monitoring and repair of interpersonal meaning in real time (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Kanki, Anca, & Helmreich, 2010).

2. CQ dampens authority-gradient failures without flattening leadership.

Steep gradients amplify silence. Motivational CQ sustains the willingness to intervene across hierarchy; behavioral CQ provides culturally acceptable challenge scripts (Ziakkas et al., 2023). Instructors can hear the difference on the flight deck and in the sim: concerns are framed as invitations to re-check rather than direct contradiction when that form lands better, and captains reciprocate by explicitly inviting second opinions. The effect is not the erasure of hierarchy but its functional use: authority is preserved while truth moves upward faster. Regulatory frameworks that expect assertiveness and leadership/teamwork behaviors are better satisfied when these cultural routes to voice are made explicit in training and assessment (FAA AC 120-51E; EASA CBTA guidance).

3. CQ improves decision quality in ambiguity by surfacing divergent preferences.

Uncertainty avoidance influences comfort with improvisation versus adherence to SOPs. Cognitive CQ allows crews to anticipate these differences and pre-commit to a decision process that protects safety without humiliating anyone: explicit “red lines,” time-boxed option generation, and back-briefs that verify intent. In multi-crew settings where a low-UA captain flies

with a high-UA first officer, this structure prevents covert resistance or passive delay. LOSA observations and debrief narratives frequently attribute “communication” breakdowns to style; a CQ lens reveals a deeper alignment problem and suggests a remedy (HFACS/LOSA with CQ inserts).

4. CQ supports psychologically safe feedback and learning.

Debrief cultures differ. Some national groups accept blunt public critique; others regard it as face-threatening. Behavioral CQ equips instructors and captains to calibrate tone, sequencing, and privacy of feedback to the audience while preserving clarity. Over time, units that practice culturally intelligent debriefing report higher participation and candor, improving the fidelity of learning loops. This is not indulgence; it is pedagogy that protects truth-telling by delivering it in a form that can be heard and acted upon.

5. CQ preserves and amplifies the “diversity bonus” in complex tasks.

Outside aviation, mixed teams often outperform homogeneous teams on complex problem-solving when diversity is well-led (Cox & Blake, 1991; Page, 2017). In multinational cockpits, similar gains are available (e.g., more thorough cross-checking, richer option generation) provided cultural friction is contained. CQ provides the containment: it channels difference into complementary cognition rather than misinterpretation or status contests. Evidence from multinational operations underscores that time spent together and culturally intelligent leadership produce a familiarization effect: trust grows, implicit coordination tightens, and performance stabilizes even in culturally heterogeneous pairings.

6. CQ-aware training fits naturally into CRM/CBTA and yields observable behaviors.

Integration is straightforward. The ADDIE model structures analysis of local cultural risks, design of objectives that tie CQ to CRM competencies, development of scenarios and debrief templates, implementation with trained instructors, and evaluation with Kirkpatrick’s four levels. Behavioral markers can be written without jargon: “calibrates directness to keep message clear and receivable”; “invites challenge explicitly, especially from junior crew.” Pre-/post- measures can track changes in decision latency, hearback/clearback fidelity, and frequency of successful challenge-and-response. Early adopters report that adding CQ markers clarifies feedback rather than expanding scope: instructors finally have language for what they have long seen but could not name.

7. CQ remains essential as automation and AI proliferate.

Decision-support tools “speak” with their own style. Voice interfaces trained on narrow speech patterns may fail on accented English; advisory phrasing may feel intrusive in high power-distance cultures; blunt alerts can be perceived as disrespectful. A culturally ergonomic approach designs for cross-cultural interpretability and trains users to calibrate trust in algorithmic agents. CQ thus extends to human-machine communication, preserving human performance as the final layer of defense in a changing system.

These findings suggest that CQ is not a peripheral “soft skill” but a safety-critical competence that strengthens existing human-factors practice. It gives crews a vocabulary and a set of behaviors for meeting across difference without sacrificing speed or precision; it gives instructors and investigators

tools to name and measure what matters; and it gives leaders leverage to turn diversity into reliable coordination rather than latent friction (Table 2).

Table 2: Research findings overview.

Finding	Where It Matters (Illustrative Use Case)	CQ Dimensions Emphasized	Implication for Safety Instruments
Faster convergence on shared mental models under time pressure	Abnormal events (e.g., automation surprise, weather diversion)	Metacognitive; Behavioral	Add ‘explicit paraphrase/summary’ and ‘calibrated directness’ markers to CBTA; briefings that surface cultural expectations
Reduced authority-gradient failures without flattening leadership	Challenge-and-response on the flight deck; mixed seniority crews	Motivational; Behavioral	CBTA markers assess how dissent is invited; SOPs include explicit invitation to speak-up
Better decisions in ambiguity by surfacing divergent preferences	Time-boxed option generation when SOP leaves discretion	Cognitive; Metacognitive	LOSA notes & CBTA checks for process clarity when teams mix uncertainty-avoidance norms
Psychologically safe feedback and learning	Line and simulator debriefs across cultures	Behavioral; Metacognitive	Instructor standards include culturally adaptive debriefing; Kirkpatrick L3/L4 track transfer/outcomes
Culturally mediated uptake of mental-health and peer-support	Peer Support Program (PSP) access; stigma-sensitive outreach and escalation	Motivational; Behavioral	Program design includes culturally literate scripts; supervisors trained in CQ for early help-seeking
Diversity bonus captured, not squandered	Complex, time-critical problem-solving in mixed teams	All four (esp. Behavioral)	Leadership guidance and CBTA markers emphasize complementarity and cross-checking
Culture moves from anecdote to data in investigations	Post-event analysis; recurrent incident patterns	All four via CQ code set	HFACS/LOSA augmented with 20-item CQ code; interview prompts elicit cultural contributors
CQ remains essential in human–AI teaming	Voice/advisory systems; trust calibration across cultures	Cognitive; Behavioral	Cultural-ergonomics requirements in HMI; training on dissent with the machine

CONCLUSION

Human performance in high-reliability transportation is always a social achievement. Procedures, checklists, and automation stabilize performance, but coordination happens in language, gesture, and expectation - domains saturated with culture. Cultural Intelligence brings this reality within reach of training, assessment, and investigation. When CQ's metacognitive, cognitive, motivational, and behavioral dimensions are aligned with CRM and CBTA, culture ceases to be a confounding background variable and becomes an explicit part of how organizations produce safety. Based on the research findings, we identified the following three domains of interest.

The first is mainstreaming CQ in training. Operators should integrate CQ learning objectives into existing CRM modules, not as add-ons but as the way communication, decision-making, leadership, and teamwork are taught. ADDIE provides the scaffold, and Kirkpatrick's model ensures evaluation does not stop at learner satisfaction but extends to on-line behaviors and operational outcomes. Instructors require their own preparation: the ability to recognize cultural behaviors without stereotyping, to modulate debriefing for different audiences, and to coach challenge-and-response scripts that work across hierarchies and styles.

The second is making culture measurable in investigations and oversight. Adopting a CQ code set for HFACS/LOSA and debrief transcripts allows organizations to detect patterns, target training, and assess change over time. Culture thus enters the safety data stream, enabling more precise explanations and more credible interventions. Regulators can accelerate this shift by encouraging the inclusion of cultural contributors in occurrence reporting and by aligning guidance on CRM assessment with CQ-informed behavioral markers.

The third is designing for cultural ergonomics as automation deepens. Human-AI teaming inherits the challenges of human-human interaction and adds new ones. Trust calibration, alert interpretation, and voice interaction will succeed or fail in part on cultural grounds (Ziakkas et al., 2024). CQ helps both designers and users anticipate these frictions and create interfaces and training that travel well across cultures.

Furthermore, the agenda for future research is well defined. Mixed-methods studies should estimate CQ's effect sizes on specific operational outcomes—time to decision in go-around calls, rates of correct readback/hearback under accented speech, or the frequency and success of challenge-and-response in steep gradients. Simulator experiments can manipulate cultural variables ethically and precisely; LOSA and routine line checks can capture real-world behavior at scale. Peer Support Programs offer another frontier, where CQ-aware outreach may improve mental-health access and preserve fitness for duty across diverse crews.

Ultimately, CQ's value is modest in claim but profound in effect. It does not promise consensus without effort or erase the differences that make teams both powerful and precarious. Instead, it gives professionals in high-reliability transportation a disciplined way to meet across difference - planning for it, noticing it early, and adapting in the moment. In aviation,

maritime, and rail, that disciplined adaptability is resilience by another name. As organizations institutionalize CQ in how they train, assess, investigate, and design, they transform cultural diversity from a source of latent risk into a daily resource for safe, efficient, and humane operations.

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