

# The Role of Advanced Air Mobility in the Future of Safe Transportation

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#### **ABSTRACT**

As urban centres grow more congested and surface infrastructure reaches its limits, the global transportation landscape is turning toward Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) as a transformative solution. AAM refers to a new class of air transportation systems - including electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, autonomous aerial vehicles, and integrated airspace management systems - designed to move people and goods safely, efficiently, and sustainably within and between urban, suburban, and rural environments. This paper explores the evolving role of AAM in shaping the future of safe, multimodal transportation, with a focus on human factors, system integration, and operational risk management. AAM introduces both opportunities and challenges for transportation safety. On one hand, it offers the potential to reduce road congestion, lower emissions, and provide rapid emergency response capabilities. On the other, it brings new complexity in terms of airspace coordination, pilot-automation interaction, and community acceptance. Drawing from current testbeds, pilot programs, and regulatory frameworks, this paper assesses how AAM can be designed and deployed to enhance - not compromise - transportation safety at scale. Human performance remains central to AAM safety, particularly during the transition from piloted to increasingly autonomous operations. AAM systems must be designed with a human-in-the-loop or human-on-the-loop architecture, ensuring that operators, controllers, and maintainers maintain adequate situational awareness and decision-making authority. Lessons from commercial aviation and unmanned systems emphasize the need for trustworthy automation, transparent interfaces, and robust training programs that prepare both professionals and the public for this new form of mobility. Equally critical is the safe integration of AAM into existing airspace. Urban Air Traffic Management (UATM) systems must balance flexibility and control, allowing for dense operations without increasing collision or incursion risks. This paper highlights the role of Al-enabled traffic coordination, real-time risk modeling, and communication protocols designed for high-density, low-altitude airspace. Collaboration between civil aviation authorities, municipal governments, and industry stakeholders will be essential to establish performance-based regulations that prioritize safety while enabling innovation. AAM's safety narrative also includes ground risk mitigation, emergency preparedness, and public confidence. Vertiport placement, environmental noise considerations, and emergency landing protocols are foundational to safe deployment and not peripheral details. Community engagement and education will be essential in building social trust and ensuring equitable access to AAM services. In conclusion, Advanced Air Mobility holds transformative potential for the future of transportation; yet, its success hinges on how safety is engineered into every layer of its development. From airspace integration and human-machine interaction to public engagement and operational resilience, AAM must be approached as a sociotechnical ecosystem. By embedding safety from the outset and aligning technological innovation with human-centered design, AAM can become a cornerstone of future transport networks that are not only faster and more sustainable, but fundamentally safer.

**Keywords**: Advanced air mobility, eVTOL, Human-automation interaction, Transportation safety, Urban airspace, Future mobility

## INTRODUCTION

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) has emerged as a system-level response to intertwined urban challenges (e.g., congestion, constrained surface rights-of-way, and uneven access) rather than as an isolated leap in vehicle technology. What distinguishes the present wave from earlier "flying car" episodes is a convergence of quieter electric propulsion, high-assurance flight control, digital traffic services, and codified operational frameworks that together render routine urban and regional air services plausible. In contemporary usage, AAM integrates new aircraft types (predominantly eVTOL and related VTOL-capable designs) with procedures, infrastructure, and governance that make high-frequency, short-stage missions safe and economically meaningful. Framed in this way, AAM is the addition of an air-based layer to multimodal networks, not a stand-alone novelty; its success is contingent on interoperability with legacy air traffic management, surface modes, and municipal planning (Goodrich et al., 2021; FAA, 2023).

Maturity constructs such as NASA's Urban Air Mobility Maturity Level (UML) scale formalize this ecosystem view by linking operational density and complexity to enabling capabilities across vehicles, airspace services, and ground infrastructure. Early UML stages envisage tightly constrained, piloted services on fixed routes; later stages anticipate dense, mixed-crew operations with progressive automation and performance-based separation. Complementary national concepts of operations (e.g., UAM ConOps 2.0) provide near-, mid-, and far-term pathways for integrating new entrants with existing air traffic control (ATC) in controlled airspace and with UTM/U-space services in high-density, low-altitude environments; these documents have become a lingua franca aligning regulators, cities, and industry around staged readiness (Goodrich et al., 2021; FAA, 2023).

Within this architecture, human performance remains the controlling factor. AAM will begin with piloted operations and grow toward supervised autonomy; throughout this transition, the allocation of functions between humans and automation must preserve situational awareness, avoid workload traps, and sustain clear authority over contingency management. The eVTOL context intensifies these demands: distributed-electric propulsion may improve failure tolerance and acoustic compatibility, yet it introduces new energy-management, envelope-protection, and mode-awareness demands; novel flight control laws and stability augmentation require training for system management rather than purely manual control (Sanchez, 2025).

Safety in AAM is also a network property. Airspace integration must balance flexibility for dynamic demand with controls that bound collision, incursion, and conformance risk. Near-term passenger services will predominantly integrate with today's ATM using adapted visual flight rules (VFR)/instrument flight rules (IFR) constructs and corridor designs; as density rises and uncrewed operations expand, digital uncrewed traffic management services (UTM/U)-space services (i.e., authorization, strategic deconfliction, conformance monitoring, and common information sharing) will assume a larger share of traffic coordination. Performance-based

regulation and data-driven oversight are indispensable as heterogeneity grows (FAA, 2023; WEF, 2024; 2025).

AAM's ground footprint carries equal weight in the safety calculus. Vertiports must be sited, engineered, and operated to manage downwash/outwash, approach/departure surfaces, obstacle environments, charging safety, emergency response, and passenger egress. Acoustics are determinative for social license; quieter signatures relative to conventional rotorcraft improve the odds of acceptance, but route design, hours-of-operation, and cumulative exposure still govern the noise experience at neighborhood scale. Energy systems affect resilience and community impact and must be addressed alongside aircraft certification (FAA, 2024; Goodrich et al., 2021).

Public value and industrial structure influence safety outcomes. Business models that produce clear benefits (i.e., airport access reliability, urgent logistics, and disaster response) are more likely to earn acceptance and justify the infrastructure investments that safety requires. Early deployments in cargo and medical logistics have shown that time-critical public service missions can build acceptance and provide tractable contexts for evaluating risk controls; passenger services can then layer on where infrastructure readiness and procedures are mature (Ziakkas & Henneberry, 2026; WEF, 2024; 2025).

Finally, AAM must be understood as a socio-technical ecosystem. Its risk picture is co-produced by design choices in aircraft and interfaces, by procedural integration with airspace and surface modes, and by the communicative practices of crews, controllers, dispatchers, and maintainers. Competency-based training and culturally aware CRM offer a way to render these interactions visible and coachable, sustaining challenge-and-response quality and handover clarity under load (Ziakkas & Plioutsias, 2024).

### **METHODOLOGY**

This study adopts an interpretivist, translational methodology designed to connect a rapidly evolving AAM knowledge base to disciplined operational practice. Rather than proposing a single monolithic model, the method specifies where and how safety mechanisms should be inserted into the AAM ecosystem as it matures from piloted demonstrations to denser, mixed-mode operations (Table 1). The approach weaves six strands: system framing, human–autonomy teaming, airspace/UTM integration, ground-risk engineering, governance and assurance, and training with competency-based evaluation. For each strand, we identify the operational junctures where ambiguity or workload typically accumulate and map corresponding practices and artifacts that make risk visible and actionable (Goodrich et al., 2021; FAA, 2023).

System framing aligns definitions and scope - AAM as an umbrella spanning urban and regional missions; eVTOL design families (vectored-thrust, lift-plus-cruise, multicopter); and maturity trajectories via NASA's UML. This alignment is a precondition for method transfer: it allows recommendations to be located on a maturity continuum and ensures

stakeholders share vocabulary when adjudicating controls (e.g., what UML-2 implies for crew qualifications, ATC coordination, or vertiport readiness).

Table 1: Research methodology overview.

Methodology Strand	Purpose / Techniques	Key Outputs	Implications for Practice
System framing	Align AAM scope with UML and national ConOps; classify mission archetypes and vehicle families.	Shared vocabulary; maturity-linked requirements.	Stage-appropriate rules of the road; consistent stakeholder expectations.
Human–autonomy teaming	Allocate functions; specify mode awareness, energy-state displays, escalation; integrate maintenance/OCC roles.	Interface and training requirements; workload traps identified.	Reduce automation surprise; preserve human authority in contingencies.
Airspace/UTM integration	Phase ATM → UTM/U- space; define information exchange, deconfliction, conformance.	Traffic- coordination playbooks; contingency pathways.	Density without overload; auditable conformance.
Ground-risk engineering	Translate vertiport/heliport guidance into design reviews; model noise/flow.	Siting checklists; community-facing artifacts.	Safer pads and approaches; social license by design.
Governance & assurance	Model cards; replayable analyses; chain-of-custody for data-driven advisories.	Traceable decisions; explainable alerts.	Trustworthy automation; regulator-ready evidence.
Training & evaluation	CBTA/EBT with CQ-aware CRM; L3/L4 evaluation metrics.	Behavioral markers; transfer measures.	Instructor-runnable curricula; observable competence.

Human-autonomy teaming specifies function allocation and interface transparency across piloted, supervised, and highly automated operations. Drawing on cockpit automation experience and recent eVTOL human-factors work, we define interface requirements and training interventions that reduce automation surprise. Maintenance and operations control roles are

integrated because predictive maintenance and digital twins shift portions of assurance from the flight deck to fleet-level decision support (Sanchez, 2025).

Airspace/UTM integration is addressed as a phased insertion problem. Near-term piloted passenger services integrate within familiar ATM constructs with tailored procedures and corridors; as density increases and cargo/utility operations expand, UTM/U-space services (i.e., authorization, strategic deconfliction, conformance monitoring) are elevated. Information exchange patterns, performance envelopes for deconfliction, and contingency handling pathways are defined to preserve human primacy while exploiting digital coordination (FAA, 2023; WEF, 2024).

Ground-risk engineering covers vertiport siting, approach/departure surfaces, downwash/acoustics, charging safety, ARFF provisions, and passenger handling. Evolving infrastructure briefs and standards are translated into siting checklists and design reviews; community-facing artifacts support social license (FAA, 2024).

Governance and assurance incorporate model cards, versioned procedures, and replayable analyses for any data-driven advisory used in dispatch, traffic coordination, or maintenance decision-making. The objective is traceability and contestability: claims about safety performance should be reproducible by third parties, and decision rights must remain with qualified humans. Chain-of-custody and explainability practices from AI-assisted investigations are adapted to operational AAM contexts.

Training and evaluation are structured under CBTA/EBT using culturally aware CRM. Behavioral markers for communication, leadership, teamwork, and decision-making in AAM contexts are specified; learning transfer is evaluated through observation (L3) and operational results (L4), including challenge-and-response quality, handover clarity, and conformance performance under load.

### **FINDINGS**

The analysis supports a pragmatic but optimistic view: AAM can improve the safety performance of urban and regional mobility if - and only if - its technologies, procedures, and institutions are aligned to the tempo and constraints of real operations (Table 2). Evidence from demonstrations, regulatory progression, and early operational frameworks converges on four interlocking themes: human–automation trust, airspace integration at density, ground-risk discipline, and social legitimacy as a safety enabler (Goodrich et al., 2021; FAA, 2023; WEF, 2024).

Human-automation trust in eVTOL operations is built at the interface. When energy-state awareness, mode annunciations, and envelope protections are presented in ways that support anticipatory control rather than retrospective diagnosis, operators maintain mental models that survive workload spikes. Early eVTOL human-factors work reinforces lessons from conventional aviation: reliability without transparency breeds brittle performance. Workload reductions accrue when status summaries and "why now" rationales accompany advisories; without this, automation surprises propagate into startle, delayed challenge, and degraded cross-monitoring.

Training that rehearses escalation routes (i.e., override, re-engage, and aviate when systems reconfigure) shifts crews from "automation management" to "mission management" under pressure (Sanchez, 2025).

Airspace integration at density depends less on a single algorithm than on choreography among services. Near-term piloted passenger flights can integrate with ATM via corridor design, time-based flow, and tailored VFR/IFR procedures; the limiting factor is not the existence of a route but the capacity of controllers and crews to maintain separation and conformance while surrounded by heterogeneous traffic. As cargo/utility operations scale and automation increases, UTM/U-space services provide digitally mediated deconfliction and conformance monitoring, but the value of these services is realized only when data are shared across providers, performance commitments are enforceable, and contingency playbooks are standardized. The more parties involved, the more crucial auditability becomes: decision logs and replayable analyses allow post-event learning without adversarial reconstruction (FAA, 2023; Ziakkas & Henneberry, 2026).

Ground-risk discipline is a gating variable for social license and operational resilience. Vertiport siting over water corridors or industrial zones reduces population overflight and simplifies approach geometry; however, at scale even favorable corridors demand rigorous downwash/outwash management, obstacle control, charging safety, and ARFF readiness. The experience of helicopter urban services provides cautionary history; AAM propositions respond with quieter acoustic profiles and redundant electric architectures, but those advantages must be consolidated through procedures and infrastructure that make rare events survivable and off-nominal operations manageable without cascading disruption (FAA, 2024).

Social legitimacy functions as a safety multiplier. Communities that understand the purpose and benefits of AAM - measured in tangible outcomes such as faster medical logistics, improved airport access reliability, or disaster-response support - are more willing to tolerate residual nuisances and more likely to cooperate in route and schedule design. Conversely, opacity around noise, access, or pricing undermines acceptance and invites restrictive responses that push operations toward brittle envelopes. Programs that publish credible noise contours, safety dashboards, and access plans, and that visibly integrate public-good missions, are better positioned to sustain density without friction.

Function allocation must be explicit and staged. Piloted AAM services will initially depend on single-pilot operations with robust automation assistance; supervision models for high-automation missions require new competencies and new failure-management concepts. Predictive maintenance and digital twins migrate portions of safety assurance from line checks to data-driven prognostics; this reshapes technician roles, intervention cadence, and data governance. Safety-critical judgment is distributed across dispatchers, maintainers, and airspace service providers who must share mental models and escalation authority (Sanchez, 2025; Ziakkas & Henneberry, 2026).

Training transfer underwrites reliability. Competency-based programs that encode observable markers (i.e., challenge-and-response clarity, paraphrase/summary under load, handover discipline, and debrief quality)

translate novel interfaces and procedures into stable performance. Cultural intelligence reduces misinterpretation during mixed-nationality operations; it clarifies when silence is deference rather than assent and equips leaders with phrasing that invites dissent without eroding authority. This is a direct mitigation for specific failure modes that emerge under time pressure and novelty.

Table 2: Research findings overview.

Finding	Where It Matters (Use Case)	Safety/Performance Link	Implications for Practice
Interface transparency drives trust	Single-pilot eVTOL ops; high-tempo terminal phases	Reduces automation surprise; sustains mode/energy awareness	Design for "why now" rationales; rehearse escalation routes in CBTA.
Density requires choreography, not a silver-bullet algorithm	Mixed ATM/UTM environments; cargo + passenger overlays	Strategic deconfliction + conformance monitoring enable scale	Standardize data-sharing, audit logs, and contingency playbooks.
Ground-risk discipline gates social license	Urban vertiports; waterfront/industrial corridors	Limits exposure; improves survivability of off-nominals	Enforce siting/approach criteria; publish noise and emergency protocols.
Social legitimacy is a safety multiplier	Cities balancing premium routes and public missions	Acceptance stabilizes operations and widens design slack	Pair airport shuttles with EMS/logistics; transparent pricing/access.
Training transfer underwrites reliability	Multinational crews; novel interfaces	Improves challenge/response, handovers, debrief quality	CBTA with CQ-aware CRM and L3/L4 evaluation.
Autonomy is an enabler, not a guarantee	Supervised fleets; high-automation corridors	Assurance and explainability remain prerequisites	Treat advisories as evidence under explanation with human primacy.

Equity and pricing influence acceptance and, indirectly, safety. Early passenger services will tend to target premium routes with predictable peaks; cargo and medical logistics present broader public benefits but depend on cost per sortie and BVLOS permissions. Pricing models (i.e., subscriptions and two-part tariffs) can widen access if designed with municipal partners; if fares persistently partition benefits away from the public, pressure for restrictions mounts, narrowing operating envelopes and reducing design slack.

Finally, the field should resist conflating "autonomous" with "safest." Autonomy is a scalability enabler, not a guarantee. High-automation operations in dense, dynamic urban airspace will demand assurance, explainability, and fault management that are still being codified. Certification trajectories for machine-learning components remain unsettled; interim architectures that deliver explainable behavior, bounded autonomy, and graceful degradation will therefore dominate near-term scaling (Ziakkas & Henneberry, 2026).

#### CONCLUSION

AAM's promise is neither speculative nor foreordained. It will be realized where engineering, operations, and governance are yoked to a disciplined

account of human performance and an honest reckoning with urban constraints. Safety in AAM is a property of fit: fit between interface design and human cognition; fit between procedures and airspace capacity; fit between infrastructure and neighborhood realities; and fit between business models and public value. When these fits are achieved, AAM can deliver timereliable mobility, strengthen emergency response, and reduce exposure to surface risks, all while seeding an industrial ecosystem that renews aviation's contribution to cities and regions (FAA, 2023; WEF, 2024).

The path forward is incremental by necessity. Near-term piloted services on fixed routes should provide the crucible for stabilizing procedures, training, and infrastructure. These services are best selected for methodological tractability - corridors where airspace integration is manageable, vertiport siting is straightforward, and public benefit is credible. In parallel, cargo and medical logistics can scale in less contentious airspace, building operational muscle memory for digital coordination, predictive maintenance, and contingency management. Each increment should be accompanied by transparent performance reporting (i.e., dispatch reliability, conformance, acoustic footprints, and safety events) so that communities and regulators can adjudicate risks with evidence rather than speculation.

Human-autonomy teaming must remain the organizing principle of flight deck and fleet operations. Interfaces should privilege transparency over cleverness; advisories should carry "why now" explanations; escalation routes should be drilled until they become reflex under time pressure. In supervised autonomy scenarios, operations control centers must be staffed and trained as safety-critical functions, with clear authority to reconfigure missions, reroute flights, or stand down segments. Predictive maintenance and digital twins should be harnessed not only to reduce AOG time but to advance safety by anticipating degradation and scheduling interventions before failure. Algorithmic components that influence safety should generate replayable artifacts to support investigation and learning (Sanchez, 2025; Ziakkas & Henneberry, 2026).

Airspace integration should remain evolutionary. For piloted passenger missions, adapted VFR/IFR procedures and corridor constructs will carry the near term; as density increases, UTM/U-space services will grow in importance. Resilience is more likely to emerge from interoperable services with enforceable performance commitments than from monolithic orchestration. Performance-based regulation and data-sharing standards are decisive, as is a culture of post-event learning supported by audit logs and replayable decisions (FAA, 2023; WEF, 2025).

Ground-risk engineering and social license must be treated as codeterminants of safety, not afterthoughts. Communities experience AAM as noise, flight tracks, visible facilities, and perceived fairness. Programs that front-load vertiport design discipline, publish intelligible noise contours, and balance premium services with public missions will face fewer political shocks and enjoy wider operating envelopes; neglect of these factors invites restrictions that compress margins and push operators into brittle configurations (FAA, 2024; Ziakkas & Henneberry, 2026). Training and evaluation are the practical levers for embedding these commitments. CBTA with culturally aware CRM can render the subtle acts that preserve safety—explicit paraphrase, calibrated directness, inclusive turn-taking—visible and coachable. Evaluation should extend beyond knowledge checks to behavioral observation and operational outcomes, using L3/L4 measures that tie training to conformance, handover quality, and error trapping (Ziakkas & Henneberry, 2026).

Two limitations deserve candor. First, autonomy certification remains unsettled for machine-learning components central to future density. Until explainability and assurance methods mature, bounded autonomy with robust human supervision will dominate near-term scaling. Second, environmental performance depends on grid mix, duty cycles, and acoustic management; the field should invest in measurement, procedural design, and community dialogue that convert technical potential into lived improvement. These limits are coordinates for responsible progress rather than reasons for delay (Goodrich et al., 2021; WEF, 2024).

To conclude, AAM can become a cornerstone of future multimodal networks if safety is engineered into every layer and evaluated in use. The strategy is clear: translate maturity frameworks into staged deployments; design human-centered interfaces that sustain trust; govern automation with traceability and human primacy; build ground infrastructure that earns social license; and train for the behaviors that make density possible without brittleness. Done this way, AAM will be remembered not for spectacle but for service: a quiet, precise addition to the city's mobility grammar that moves people and goods with speed, dignity, and safety (FAA, 2023; WEF, 2025).

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